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This paper reconsiders Sinn’s (1991) nucleus theory of the corporation by comparing two 
different regimes for the equity trap. In the first of these, all cash paid to the shareholders is 
taxed as dividends, in the second, shareholders are allowed a tax-free return of capital 
contributed through new issues. A substantial difference is found between the regimes in the 
size of initial equity injections, although in both regimes, no dividends are paid until a new 
long-run equilibrium is reached. Contrary to Sinn, we find that with optimal behavior, the cost 
of new equity is lower than suggested by conventional formulae. 
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 1. Introduction 
The economic consequences of dividend taxation have been the subject of a continuing debate 
among public finance researchers for more than a quarter of a century. Much of this 
discussion has been concerned with whether the “new” or “old” view of dividend taxation 
best describes its effects.
1 A crucial difference between the two views is in the source of 
equity finance used at the margin by the corporate firm. Under the new view, the marginal 
source of equity is retained earnings. As the dividend tax reduces the opportunity cost to the 
shareholders of an additional unit of profits retained for investment in the same proportion as 
it reduces future dividends, the dividend tax has no impact on investment incentives. Under 
the old view, the dividend tax falls also on marginal investment projects. Though the exact 
interpretation of the old view varies between different researchers, a common assumption is 
that the firm is unable to cut dividends to finance new investment projects or finds it costly to 
do so.
2 With new issues of shares rather than retained profits as the marginal source of equity, 
the shareholders’ opportunity cost of investment is not mitigated by the dividend tax, and as a 
result, the tax reduces the rate of return to investment.  
 
That the dividend tax falls on marginal investments financed by new issues of equity is, 
however, accepted also by holders of the “new” view. “New” view- models typically state 
that the cost of new share issues equals the shareholders’ after-tax rate of return requirement 
adjusted for the total tax – at the corporate and personal levels – levied on distributed profits. 
A useful reference here is the study by King and Fullerton (1984) whose formulae for the cost 




Some time ago, however, Sinn (1991) argued that the distortion from dividend taxation is 
larger than the conventional formulae such as those derived in King and Fullerton (ibid.) 
suggest. Sinn’s point is that earlier research underestimated the true cost of equity because it 
invariably assumed that profits from marginal investment projects were distributed as 
dividends. 
 
                                                 
1 The new view of equity was developed by Auerbach (1979), Bradford (1981) and King (1977). For a survey of 
the debate, see Auerbach (2002) and Auerbach and Hassett (2002, 2005). 
2 See Auerbach (2002). 
3 See for example OECD (1991) and EU (2001).   2
To derive the cost of equity in a consistent manner, Sinn sets up a model of an all-equity firm, 
with a personal tax on dividends as the only tax parameter. Share repurchases are ruled out, 
leaving dividends and internal investment as the only possible uses of profits. The outcome of 
this model is a “nucleus” theory of the corporation. A firm faced by an initial shortage of 
retainable profits following a disturbance to the marginal productivity of capital, will let the 
shareholders inject less than the total amount of funds needed to reach a new long-run 
equilibrium. Once the “nucleus” of new equity has been obtained, the firm embarks upon a 
growth path using less expensive retained earnings. The firm then continues to grow by 
internal funds, issuing no more shares, and paying no dividends until the marginal 
productivity of capital is equated to the rate of interest. Though no parametric expression for 
the cost of new equity is obtained from this analysis, Sinn finds, for “mild assumptions” about 
the form of the firm’s production function, that the marginal productivity of capital 




The purpose of this paper is to reconsider Sinn’s claim that earlier research underestimated 
the cost of new issues of equity. More generally, we examine how the seize of the dividend 
tax distortion is determined by the character of the so called “equity trap”. We set up a 
dynamic model of an all equity firm, which includes two varieties of the equity trap: The first 
is the same as posited by Sinn, namely where it is impossible for the firm to pay cash to its 
shareholders that is not taxed as dividends. This is technically captured by constraining new 
share issues to be non-negative. Though this a common requirement in tax models of the firm, 
its full implication – turning the dividend tax into a combination of a tax on (distributed) 
profits and a capital levy on issues of new equity - is seldom made clear. The second variety 
of the equity trap allows the shareholders a tax-free return of the original capital contributed 
through the new issues. This means that negative new share issues (or other forms of tax-free 
cash distributions) are allowed, but only to the extent of the amount contributed by the 
shareholders through new share issues. 
 
We conclude from this analysis that Sinn’s comparison between the cost of capital in his 
model, following the new issue, and King and Fullerton’s expression for the cost of new 
equity, is misleading and is in fact a comparison between apples and oranges. The reason for 
                                                 
4 Sinn (1991), p. 284.   3
this is that Sinn and King-Fullerton rely on different assumptions not only about dividend 
behavior but also, and more importantly, about the equity trap, that is, the design of the tax 
code. Sinn’s model explicitly relies on the strong form of the equity trap, including both 
retained earnings and new equity, whereas the cost-of-capital expressions of the King-
Fullerton type implicitly assume that shareholders are allowed a tax-free return of original 
capital, leaving new share issues outside the trap. 
 
Paying dividends subsequent to a new issue of equity does not constitute optimal behavior 
under neither of the two varieties of the equity trap. However, the King-Fullerton assumption 
that dividends are paid subsequent to a new issue does not cause a downward bias in 
estimating the cost of capital, as Sinn suggests. With dividends being paid in the year 
following the new issue, the cost of capital rather turns out to be higher than is the case when 
the firm behaves optimally (what is optimal behavior depends on the equity trap). 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model 
of an all equity firm, and derives general expressions for the cost of capital for two versions of 
the equity trap. Optimal behavior following a new issue of equity is determined in section 3, 
which also includes numerical simulations to compare the firm’s optimal behavior under the 
two versions of the equity trap. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
We derive the firm’s cost of capital by setting up a dynamic model in discrete time with a 
personal tax on dividends τ  as the only tax parameter. The owner is assumed to maximize 













+ ∑ ,     (1) 
 
where D denotes dividends as defined in the firm’s accounts,   is the amount of new share 
issues, r is the discount rate and 
N
θ  is the after-tax value of a unit of dividends,  1 θ τ ≡− . The 
firm’s budget constraint in period s is a cash flow identity, where capital inflow equals capital 
outflow   4
 
  () 1 s ss FK N D I − s + =+ .     (2) 
 
The production function  () F K  depends only on the stock of capital, where the stock in 
period   becomes fully efficient in production in period s. To keep the model simple, 
capital depreciation is ignored, which implies that the stock of capital evolves over time as  
1 s−
 
  1 s s KI K − += s .     (3) 
 
As usual, dividends must be non-negative 
 
0 s D ≥ .      (4) 
 
In the following, we distinguish between two varieties of the model. In the first of these we 
require issues of new equity to be non-negative 
 
0 s N ≥ .      (5) 
 
Though this constraint is standard in tax models of the firm (e.g. Sinn (1991)), its full 
implication is seldom made clear. With (5), there is no way for the shareholders to withdraw 
cash from the firm except as dividends. The effect of this is that not only current and past 
profits (as emphasized by the new view), but also the new issues of equity injected into the 
firm are trapped by the dividend tax. Put differently, constraint (5) models the dividend tax as 
a combination of a tax on (distributed) profits and a capital levy on issues of new equity. We 
will denote this variety of the model the full equity trap-case, or F-case, for short. 
  
The second variety of the model – the partial equity trap-case, or P-case – assumes instead 
that shareholders are allowed a tax-exempt return of funds injected into the firm by issues of 
new equity. We model this assumption by letting A be the remaining stock of past (positive or 
negative) equity injections, and requiring that 
 
0 s A ≥ .      (6)   5
 
where the stock  A evolves as 
 
  1 s s AN A − += s .     (7) 
 
Constraint (6) implies that negative issues of equity are allowed ( 0 N < ), but only within the 
limit set by the requirement that the sum total of past equity injections (positive or negative) 
be non-negative. Replacing constraint (5) by constraint (6) and the motion (7) therefore 
confines the dividend tax to be a tax on distributed profits, leaving any withdrawals of funds 
to the extent of the original investment of the shareholders free of tax. 
 
The model (for both varieties of the equity trap) defines a discrete-time control problem with 
control variables N, D and I, and state variables K and A. By imposing shadow values for the 
constraints and motions – 
D μ  for (2), 
K μ  for (3), 
D λ  for (4), 
N λ  for (5), 
A λ  for (6), 
A μ  for 
(7) – and maximizing the owners’ after-tax dividend stream the optimization problem takes 
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for the P-case. 
 
The first order conditions for D, I and K are the same for both varieties of the model 
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that is, the cost of capital is determined by the rate of interest and the marginal valuation of 
capital, 
K μ , for two consecutive periods. 
 
The long-run cost of capital 
For a firm that relies on retained earnings as the marginal source of finance and also pays 
dividends, the shadow value of the dividend constraint appearing in (8) is zero,  . Since 




D K μ μ =
1
KK
ss μ μ + == θ
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. The general expression for the cost of capital in (11) is therefore  
 
  .       ( 1 2 )   K F =
 
With 
K μ θ = , the owner is indifferent between retaining earnings and receiving dividends, 
and as a result of this, the dividend tax does not distort the steady state value of the firm’s 
capital stock. This is of course is the well-known result from the new view of equity.  
 
New equity as the marginal source of finance 
The first order condition specific to the F-case is 
 
s N   ,     (13)  1
DN
ss μλ −+ + = 0
 
while those specific to the P-case are 
 
s N   ,     (14)  1
DA
ss μμ −+ + = 0  7
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New shares are issued by the firm only occasionally as a response to exogenous disturbances 
to the productivity of capital when retained earnings are insufficient to finance the required 
addition to the capital stock. A F-case firm hit by a productivity shock in period t will issue 
new equity sufficient to depress the marginal value of capital to unity,  1
K
t μ =
5. The cost of 
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Since the marginal value of capital in the period subsequent to the new issue,  1
K
t μ + , cannot be 
determined without further assumptions, equation (16) means that no parametric expression 
for the cost of capital is available for the F-case firm. However, in the special case where the 
firm pays dividends immediately following the new issue,  1
K
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which corresponds to a result derived by Auerbach (1983, p. 925). 
 
When the P-case firm issues new shares in period t,  . This means that the shadow value 
, and by equation (9) and the first order conditions for N and A (eqs. (14) and (15)) we 
derive 






t μ +  = . Using the general expression for the cost of capital (eq. (11)) we 
therefore derive the P-case firm’s cost of capital following the new equity issue as 
(1 )
K








= .       ( 1 8 )  
                                                 
5 See equations (9) and (13).   8
 
Again, no parametric expression is available.
6 In case the firm pays dividends following the 
new issue 1
K









,       ( 1 9 )  
 
as the expression for the cost of capital for a P-case firm. This is King and Fullerton’s (1984) 
well-known expression for the cost of new equity. 
 
For ease of comparison, the expressions for the costs of capital derived above are summarized 
in Table 1. The character of the equity trap clearly has important implications for the cost of 
new issues of equity. When the marginal value of capital in the period subsequent to the new 
issue,  1
K
t μ + , is the same in the two cases, the F-case firm has a higher cost of capital. The 
intuition for this result is particularly clear when the firm pays dividends, see equations (17) 
and (19). The pre-tax marginal rate of return of the F-case firm must then be sufficiently high 
to compensate not only for the tax on the income from the marginal investment but also for 
the tax upon the return of the original capital (i.e. the tax code turns the dividend tax into a 
combination of a tax on (distributed) profits and a capital levy). 
 
                                                 
6A simple and interesting alternative to (7) would be to let the (net) stock of remaining  equity injections, A, be 
augmented annually by stockholders’ rate of return requirement, that is   ( ) 1 1
s ss A rNA
− + += . Replacing (7) by 
this motion yields 
t K F r = , that is independent of tax. Such a modified  scheme is basically similar to both  the 
Swedish Annell-deduction (a tax benefit based on new issues), see  Auerbach (2002), p. 15,  and the new 
Norwegian Shareholder Income Tax, see Sørensen (2005).   9
Table 1. Summary of results for F- and P-cases 
  Full Equity Trap   Partial Equity Trap  
Tax code  All cash paid to shareholders is 
taxed as dividends 
Shareholders are allowed a tax-free 
return of the original capital  
Relevant 
constraints 
Issues of new equity must be 
non-negative: 
 
0 s N ≥     
Accumulated amount of past equity 
injections must be non-negative: 
 
0 s A ≥ , where  1 s ss AN − += A  
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Auerbach (1983) 












Sinn’s (1991) results reconsidered 
One of the important conclusions from Sinn’s (1991) analysis is that, for “mild assumptions” 
about the form of the firm’s production function, the cost of capital subsequent to an issue of 
new equity is higher than obtained from the expression for new equity derived by King- 
Fullerton, that is  (1 )
t K Fr τ =− .  
 
Equations (1)-(5) above, which explicitly require new issues of equity to be non-negative, 
give a discrete-time variant of Sinn’s continuous-time model, and the resulting equation (16) 
for the F-case, corresponds to Sinn’s expression for the cost of new equity. We notice 
moreover that King-Fullerton’s cost of new equity is given by equation (19), as a special case 
of the tax regime where shareholders are allowed a tax-free return of original capital, 
contributed through new issues (P-case). Sinn’s criticism of the King-Fullerton model for 
underestimating the cost of new equity is hence based on a comparison between two different 
tax regimes, with different implications for the equity trap and for the cost of capital.  
 
Moreover, although the assumption that profits from marginal investment projects are paid as 
dividends (as in King-Fullerton) does affect the cost of capital, the direction of this effect is   10
opposite to that suggested by Sinn: With no dividends being paid in the year following the 
new issue, the shadow value equals 1
K
t μ θ + > . A simple comparison between (16) and (17) or 
between (18) and (19) makes it clear that the cost of capital then is lower than would be the 
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for the P-case firm. This means that optimal behavior, which in Sinn’s case amounts to 
retaining earnings and embarking upon a growth path, is associated with a lower cost of 
capital than follows from a policy of paying dividends subsequent to the new issue. 
 
3. Optimal behavior and simulation of the growth path 
 
Optimal behavior in the Sinn – F-case – model following a new issue of equity was briefly 
described in section 1 above, and readers looking for a formal and detailed treatment are 
referred to Sinn’s paper. This section first explains the incentives faced by the P-case firm, 
and then proceeds to illustrate and compare the optimal behavior of the two types of firms 
making use of a few numerical simulations. 
 
There are three alternative routes for the P-case firm to follow subsequent to a new share 
issue in period t, see the Chart 1 below. We refer to Appendix A for the technical details. We 
rule out two of these alternatives, which both imply that the firm would maintain a constant 
and positive stock of new equity (A>0), and use its profits either for paying dividends or for 
additional investment. Behaving optimally, the P-case firm will first use current profits and 
some disinvestment to undertake a gradual repayment of the original issue of equity. Once the 
new issue has been repaid (A=0), the firm will retain profits earned in subsequent periods and 
add to its capital stock. This second phase corresponds to the growth path analyzed by Sinn,   11
where the firm continues to grow by internal funds, paying no dividends until the new long-
run equilibrium is reached. 
 
Chart 1. Alternative routes for a P-case firm following a new share issue. 
 
Non-optimal behavior: 
Use the profits to pay 
dividends in period 
t+1 and maintain a 
positive stock of new 
equity. 
Non-optimal behavior: 
Use the profits for 
additional investment 
in period t+1 and 
maintain a positive 
stock of new equity. 
Feasible behavior: 
Use the profits for 
repayment in period 
t+1 of the initial issue 
of equity. 
Non-optimal behavior: 
Total repayment of the original 
issue of equity, financed by 
profits in period t+1 and a 
reduced stock of capital. 
Optimal behavior: 
Partial repayment of the 
original issue of equity, 
financed both by profits in 
period t+1 and disinvestment. 













As explained above, our model cannot be used to derive parametric expressions for the short 
run costs of capital. Because the model is written in discrete time, we are still able to make 
considerable progress in illustrating and comparing the behavior of the two types of firms by 
resorting to numerical simulations. We will assume that there occurs an exogenous 
disturbance to the firms that raises the marginal productivity of capital, and that the resulting 
investment needs cannot be financed from retained earnings. 
 
The F-case firm will then issue new equity sufficient to depress 
K μ to unity. A growth path 
financed by retained earnings follows, and continues until the marginal valuation of capital 
has fallen to unity minus the dividend tax rate. For the P-case firm the starting condition is, 
likewise, that the marginal valuation of the injection of new equity equals unity, but this 
comes from two conceptually different sources: The first is the direct increase in the 
productive capacity of the firm, which is valued at the shadow price of capital, 
K μ . The 
second derives from the fact that the new equity enables the owner a tax-free return of capital, 
valued at the shadow price 
A μ . The condition  1
KA μμ + =  then holds all along the firm’s   12
optimal path, with 
K μ falling from its initial value in period t in the range  , to its 





We refer to Appendix B for a step-by-step account of the simulations. In general terms, we 
make use of the first order conditions to determine the development over time of the marginal 
valuation of capital, 
K μ , the pre-tax marginal rate of return,  K F , the capital stock, K , and – 
in the P-case – the stock of new equity, A. We specify the firm’s production function in the 
Appendix and we assume that the market rate of interest is 5 per cent.  
 
The results of the simulations are illustrated in Figures 1-2 for a dividend tax rate of 30 
percent (τ =0.3).  The cost of capital is initially 6.22 percent for the P-case firm, or 1.24 times 
the long-run cost of capital (of 5 percent), compared to 12.73 percent for the F-case firm, or 
2.55 times the long-run cost of capital. As a result of these differences, there is a striking 
difference between the firms in the amount of new equity injected by the shareholders: The P-
case firm starts its adjustment path with a capital stock which is more than four times as large 
as that of the F-case firm. Following the new issue, the F-case firm uses all profits for internal 
investment, and completes its growth path in 13 years. The adjustment phase of the P-case 
firm is of approximately the same length, but during first half of this phase, the firm uses both 
current profits and disinvestment to repay the original new equity to the shareholders.  
 
With a reduction in the dividend tax from 30 to 15 percent, the adjustment periods of both 
firms are shortened, but the effect is stronger for the F-case firm than for the P-case firm, see 
Figures 3-4. The tax cut also reduces the cost of new equity and increases the seize of the 
initial equity injection, for both firms. The distorting effects of dividend taxation remain 
considerably larger for the F-case firm than for the P-case firm. 
 
The gradual adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium obviously causes a loss in output, 
compared to a hypothetical case where the firms could immediately reach their new long-run 
capital stocks and output levels. The annual output losses, accumulated over the adjustment 
period, add up to 32 percent (of the hypothetical no-tax output level) for the F-case firm, and 
to 18.9 percent for the P-case firm, when the dividend tax rate is 30 percent. With a 15 
percent tax on dividends, the output losses are 19.3 and 10.5 percent, respectively
7. 
                                                 























Figure 1: The cost of capital following a new equity issue in the F- and P-cases when the 









































































Figure 3: The cost of capital following a new equity issue in the F- and P-cases when the 
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4. Concluding comments  
This paper has examined how the distortions caused by dividend taxation differ depending on 
the character of the equity trap. We compare two different tax regimes, one where it is 
impossible for the firm to pay cash to its shareholders that is not taxed as dividends (the full 
equity trap), the other where the shareholders are allowed a tax-free return of the original 
capital contributed through new issues (the partial equity trap). For both regimes, adjustments 
following an initial distortion take place gradually with no dividends being paid until the firm 
is in a new long-run equilibrium. With a full equity trap (F-case), as assumed in Sinn’s 
analysis, the firm embarks upon a growth path following the new issue, using retained 
earnings as the source of funds, whereas with a partial equity trap (P-case), the growth path is 
preceded by a phase where the original capital injected into the firm is repaid to the 
shareholders. Our numerical simulations indicate a substantial difference between the F- and 
P-cases in the seize of the initial equity injections, and a resulting difference in the output 
losses over the adjustment periods. 
 
We conclude from our analysis that Sinn’s criticism of the King-Fullerton model for 
underestimating the cost of new equity is misleading as it amounts to a comparison across 
different tax regimes – the F-case and the P-case. Contrary to Sinn, we also find that with 
optimal behavior following a new issue, the cost of capital is lower than suggested by 
conventional formulae. 
 
The constraint on new share issues for the P-case was designed to clarify the assumptions 
implicit in King-Fullerton-type expressions for the cost of new equity. It is evident, moreover, 
that these assumptions do have some foundation in company and tax law. Though the tax 
code varies across countries, most countries would allow shareholders a tax-free recovery of 
their initial equity following a winding-up decision. Techniques such as share re-purchases 
and combinations of splits and share redemptions, have also gained in importance in most 
countries. These procedures may trigger capital gains taxation, but the deductibility of the 
acquisition costs of shares sold or redeemed ensures that the original contributions of equity 
capital do escape the equity trap.  
 
Different limitations on the tax-free return of new external equity are easily incorporated into 
the present framework, as intermediate cases between the F- and P-cases. The general result   15
from such extensions is that the more circumscribed is the possibility of returning original 
capital, the smaller will be the original new issue, and the shorter the initial phase where 
profits are used for redemption of equity. Even though the present model thus may be 
extended to other cases, the specific rules governing the shareholders’ right to a tax-free 
return of the original capital still seems to be a subject worthy of further study.    
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Appendix A: Technical details on optimal behavior 
This appendix explores the behavior of the P-case firm subsequent to a new share issue. A 
new share issue at time t implies a positive stock of new equity, i.e. , and, because of 
this,  . Since   (eq. 9) and by the first order conditions for N and A (eqs. (14) 
and (15)) we derive 




D K μ μ =
 
() 1 1( 1 )
K KK K
tt t t rr r
K
t μ μμ μ + =+ − = − − < μ ,   (22) 
 
which may be interpreted to mean that whenever the stock of new equity is positive, the 
marginal valuation of capital will decrease  from the current period to the next. Two 
alternative routes for the firm to follow subsequent to the new issue of equity at time t may 
now be ruled out. 
 
The first is where the firm would use the profits earned in period t+1 to pay dividends and 
maintain a positive stock of new equity,  . With  1 0 t A + > 1 0
A
t λ + = , this would mean a continued 
reduction in the marginal value of capital,  21
K K
tt μ μ + + < . However, since payment of dividends 
requires that the marginal valuation of capital take its minimum value  1
K
t μ θ + = , such a further 
reduction for time t+2 is impossible. We conclude therefore that the firm will not 
simultaneously pay dividends and keep a positive stock of new equity.  
 
A second route, following the initial equity injection, would be to use current profits in period 
t+1 for additional investment, which would mean  . However, with   and 
 as before, we derive 
1 t K + > t K 1 0 t A + >
1 0
A











=       ( 2 3 )  
 
and since  21
K K
tt μ μ + < +  when  , the cost-of-capital expression  1 0
A
t λ + =
K
t K r F
t 1 + = μ (eq. (18)) and 
equation (23) give that  . Hence, the firm’s first order conditions imply a decrease in 
the capital stock. Also the second route, where the firm would use current profits to add to its 
capital stock must be ruled out.  
1 t K + < t K
 
The only feasible use of profits for period t+1 is therefore for repayment of the initial issue of 
equity. Assuming first that repayment takes place gradually, that is with   and  1 0 t A + > 1 0
A
t λ + = , 
we may use equations (22) and (23), to solve for the firm’s capital stock,   and, by using 
the budget constraint, also for the remaining stock of new equity, 
1 t K +
1 t A + . Since   implies 
that  , this partial repayment of the original issue of equity is financed both by current 
profits and disinvestment. Alternatively, the firm may choose to repay the entire issue of new 
equity at time t+1, by a further reduction in the stock of capital. However, such a reduction is 
not compatible with the first order conditions, since   when 
1 0
A
t λ + =
1 t K + < t K
1 0
A
t λ + > 1 0 t A + = , yields a lower 
cost of capital, implying a larger capital stock. Repaying the entire issue of equity at time t+1 
is therefore ruled out. 
 
We conclude that following an issue of new equity, the firm will use its profits neither to pay 
dividends, nor to add to its capital stock, but to repay the new equity. Repayment takes place 
gradually, and if profits in, say, time period s-1, is insufficient to return the remaining stock of 
new equity, that is  () 11 s s F KA − < −
1
, a positive stock will be kept for the following period, 
. If, on the other hand,  0 s A > () 1 s s FK A − ≥ − , the return of the initial equity issue will be 
completed in period s, possibly in conjunction with an addition to the capital stock (if 
() 11 s s FK A −− > ).  
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Appendix B: Technical details on the simulations 
For the P-case firm, we begin by choosing, tentatively, a starting value for 
K
t μ in the feasible 
interval  . With  , because of the new issue, we then determine  1
K
t θμ << 0
A
t λ = 1
K
t μ +  from 
equation (22) in Appendix A and solve for the initial stock of capital from the cost-of-capital 
expression 
K
t K r F
t 1 + = μ  (eq. (18)). Since  1 0
A
t λ + =  when  ( ) tt A FK > (by the argument 
presented above), we use an updated version of equation (22) to compute  2
K
t μ + , and solve for 
the firm’s capital stock,  , implicitly given by equation (23) in Appendix A. From the 
firm’s budget constraint we also determine the remaining stock of new equity,  . This 
procedure is repeated until 
1 t K +
1 t A +
() 11 s s F KA − ≥ −
1
. The repayment of the initial equity issue is then 
completed in period s, possibly in conjunction with an addition to the capital stock (if 
() 1 s s F KA − > − ). Having repaid the new equity, the firm will then use all of the profits earned 
in subsequent periods for investment, which means that we add 
 to the capital stock of the previous year,  . This “growth 
process” is continued until the marginal productivity of capital is equated to the rate of 
interest. If the marginal valuation of capital in the first round of simulations then happens to 
exceed (fall below) 
() 1 , 1, 2..... vv IF K v ss − == + + 1 v K −
θ , the whole procedure is repeated, using a lower (higher) starting value 
for 
K
t μ . 
 
We compute the behavior of the F-case firm in a similar way. Since the firm’s starting 
condition for period t is that the marginal valuation of capital equals unity, we choose, 
tentatively, a value for the marginal valuation of capital in the next period,  . From 
(16), we then compute the initial capital stock,  , and by adding investment equal to 
, we obtain the capital stock and the marginal productivity of capital for the following 
year, t+1. This step-wise procedure is continued until the marginal productivity of capital 
equals the rate of interest. If then, as described above, the marginal valuation of capital 
happens to exceed (fall below) 
1 1
K
t μ + <
t K
( t FK )
θ , the whole simulation procedure is repeated, picking a lower 
(higher) starting value for  1
K
t μ + .  
 
The simulations require a specification of the firm’s production function. We let 
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() FK C K
α =     (24) 
 
represent the firm’s output, where C determines the level of technology, and α  is capital’s 
share of output. With α  = 0.5, C = 1 and the market interest rate r = 0.05, the long-run capital 
stock, as determined by   (eq. (12)), is K=100.  K F = rCESifo Working Paper Series 
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